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Abstract—Scalar recoding is popular to speed up ECC scalar
multiplication: non-adjacent form, double-base number system,
multi-base number system. But fast recoding methods require
pre-computations: multiples of base point or off-line conversion.
In this paper, we present a multi-base recoding method for
ECC scalar multiplication based on i) a greedy algorithm
starting least significant terms first, ii) cheap divisibility tests
by multi-base elements and iii) fast exact divisions by multi-
base elements. Multi-base terms are obtained on-the-fly using a
special recoding unit which operates in parallel to curve-level
operations and at very high speed. This ensures that all recoding
steps are performed fast enough to schedule the next curve-level
operations without interruptions. The proposed method can be
fully implemented in hardware without pre-computations. We
report FPGA implementation details and very good performances
compared to state-of-art results.
Index Terms—elliptic curve cryptography; scalar multiplica-
tion; DBNS; MBNS; divisibility test; exact division by constant;
I. INTRODUCTION
Scalar multiplication is the most time consuming operation
in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) protocols. It is denoted
by [k]P where P is a curve point and k a scalar. Basic scalar
multiplication algorithm scans each bit of k and performs some
curve-level operations depending on the bit value. Scalar repre-
sentation significantly impacts the number of point operations
to be executed and overall computation time. Consequently
scalar recoding methods are very popular: non-adjacent forms
(NAF and wNAF), double- or multi-base number systems
(DBNS/MBNS), etc. Sec. II recalls these methods and basic
ECC elements. Previous fast recoding methods require a pre-
computation step prior to scalar multiplication. For wNAF,
several multiples of P have to be precomputed and stored.
For DBNS/MBNS, the scalar must be recoded off-line.
Below we present a method and its FPGA implementation
to recode on-the-fly the scalar using MBNS without pre-
computations. Our recoding is performed in parallel to curve-
level operations. It uses very cheap divisibility tests for each
base element and an efficient implementation of exact divi-
sion algorithms used for multiple-precision arithmetic. Exact
division refers to division where the remainder is known to be
zero. Due to paper length limit, we only deal here with curves
defined over Fp but our method can be easily applied in F2m
case. Sec. III and IV present respectively unsigned and signed
versions of our method. Section V compares our results to
state-of-art ones.
1: Q← O
2: for i from n− 1 to 0 do
3: Q← 2Q (DBL)
4: if ki = 1 then Q← Q+ P (ADD)
5: return Q
Fig. 1. Double-and-add algorithm for scalar multiplication Q = [k]P
II. STATE-OF-ART IN ECC SCALAR MULTIPLICATION
A brief introduction is presented below. The reader is
referred to [1], [2] for further details. An elliptic curve E over
the prime field Fp, of large characteristic, can be defined by
the simplified Weierstrass equation y2 = x3+ax+b with curve
parameters a, b ∈ Fp and 4a
3 +27b2 6= 0. The rational points
on the curve and a special point, called point at infinity denoted
by O, form an abelian group (denoted additively where O acts
as the identity) on top of which the cryptosystem works. Given
points P,Q on the curve, curve-level operations are defined:
point addition P +Q where P 6= ±Q (denoted by ADD) and
point doubling [2]P = P+P (DBL). Scalar multiplication [k]P
is defined by [k]P = P+P+· · ·+P with k−1 additions. The
scalar k is (kn−1kn−2 . . . k1k0)2 with n in the range 160–520
bits for typical cryptographic sizes.
Each operation at curve-level involves a sequence of oper-
ations at field-level (multiplication: M, square: S, inversion: I).
Curve points can be represented using affine coordinates (A):
(x, y). In that case, ADD and DBL operations require expensive
field inversions (in Fp one inversion is about 15 to 30 multipli-
cations). Hence most efficient implementations use projective
coordinates. In this paper, we use Jacobian coordinates (J ) as
a popular class of projective coordinates where (X : Y : Z)
corresponds to the affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3) for Z 6= 0.
A. Basic Scalar Multiplication Methods
Basic scalar multiplication algorithm, called double-and-
add, is presented on Fig. 1. Its average computation cost is
0.5n ADD+ n DBL (0.5n ones in k for security requirement).
Point addition at line 4 always uses the same point P . Then
P can be kept in affine coordinates and used by mixed addition
mADD (J +A → J ) in order to speed up the computation and
reduce the P coordinates storage (see Sec. V-A for cost).
Point subtraction (SUB) is as efficient as point addition (A:
−P = (x,−y) and J : −P = (X : −Y : Z) for curves
[k]P
ADD, DBL, . . .
M, S, I in Fp
one scalar multiplication
hundreds of curve op.
thousands of field op.
clock cycles
DBL
M . . . M S . . .
Fig. 2. Pyramid of operations in a scalar multiplication (arbitrary scale)
over Fp). This motivates the use of signed digits such as
NAF (ki ∈ {0,±1}) where no two consecutive signed digits
are non-zero [1, Sec. 3.3.1]. Scalar multiplication using NAF
recoding is straightforward: replace line 4 in Fig. 1 by “if
ki 6= 0 then Q ← Q sign(ki) P ”. The average computation
cost is 0.3n ADD+ n DBL (cost for SUB is the same than ADD).
Another optimization, called wNAF, processes a window
of w digits of k at a time. wNAF uses digits ki ∈
{0,±1,±3,±5, . . . ,±2w−1 − 1}, and at most one of any
w consecutive digits is non-zero [1, Sec. 3.3.1]. Multiples
Pj = [j]P have to be pre-computed and stored for all
j ∈ {3, 5, . . . , 2w−1 − 1}. Scalar multiplication is done using
ADD/SUB of pre-computed multiple Pj (corresponding pseudo-
code is “if ki 6= 0 then Q← Q sign(ki) P|ki|”). The average
computation cost is n/(w + 1) ADD + n DBL without the pre-
computation step. These pre-computations may be interesting
if the same point P is reused. In practice, wNAF is used with
w ≤ 4 for limited storage overhead.
Fig. 2 illustrates the typical number of operations required
at each level. One [k]P operation requires hundreds of curve-
level operations. Each curve operation (ADD, DBL) requires
a sequence of 8–12 field-level operations. Finally, each field
operation requires tens (for large operators) to hundreds (for
small iterative operators) of clock cycles.
B. Scalar Multiplication using Double-Base Number System
DBNS was initially introduced in [3], used for modular
exponentiation in [4], for signal processing in [5] and for ECC
in [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] and [11] (which is very complete). In
DBNS, number x is represented by the sum of mixed powers
of two co-prime integers b1 and b2, the two bases, typically
(b1, b2) = (2, 3), such that x =
∑n′
i=1 xib
ui
1 b
vi
2 with xi = ±1.
Unsigned DBNS (xi = 1) leads to larger terms number n
′.
For ECC computations in DBNS, a new curve-level oper-
ation has to be defined: point tripling [3]P = P + P + P
(denoted TPL). It is faster than ADD (see Sec. V-A for cost).
DBNS is a very sparse representation (number of terms n′ is
very small compared to number of bits n in standard binary
representation). Then, the number of point additions is re-
duced. In [7], a special type of DBNS recoding, called DBNS
chain, is proposed with an Horner like factorization of DBLs
and TPLs operations (under conditions u1 ≥ u2 ≥ . . . ≥ un′
and v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn′ ) leading to higher improvement. We
will report performances of some DBNS scalar multiplication
algorithms from literature in Sec. V. There are DBNS scalar
multiplication extensions using pre-computed multiples of P
leading to higher speed but with a higher storage cost [11].
DBNS helps to reduce the total computation time. But
binary to DBNS conversion is performed off-line. Most of
proposed conversions proceed most significant terms first by
subtracting to k a good/best approximation of k by a term of
form 2u3v using huge tables or expensive computations. The
authors from [10] claim that tree based approach conversion
is too costly for hardware implementation of systems using
integers in the cryptographic range (p. 437, Sec. 3). In [8],
10 to 72 points have to be pre-computed and stored (a better
usage of silicon area should be a parallel architecture). In [12],
an FPGA implementation of binary to DBNS conversion is
proposed but only for very small operands (n ≤ 20 bits) in
signal processing applications.
DBNS is a very redundant number system. In [13], this
redundancy is used to randomly select the recoding as a
counter-measure against some side-channel attacks (SCAs).
C. Scalar Multiplication using Multi-Base Number System
MBNS is a generalization of DBNS with more than two
bases [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19] and [20]. A multi-base
B is a tuple of l co-prime integers (b1, b2, . . . , bl). Number x
is represented as the sum of terms x =
∑n′
i=1
(
xi
∏l
j=1 b
ej,i
j
)
with xi = ±1. MBNS is a very sparse and redundant
representation. In literature, proposed multi-bases are often
(2, 3, 5) and (2, 3, 5, 7).
For ECC scalar multiplication in MBNS, new curve-level
operations have to be defined: point quintupling [5]P (QPL),
point septupling [7]P (SPL), point eleventupling [11]P (EPL),
etc. These new operations are more efficient than equivalent
sequences of ADD, DBL and TPL operations (see Sec. V-A for
typical costs). MBNS scalar multiplication is similar to DBNS
algorithms with more curve-level operations QPL, SPL, etc.
MBNS suffers from the same limitation as DBNS: the
need for off-line conversion with huge tables and/or long
pre-computations. In [14] and [17] conversion uses good
approximations of k using terms of form ±
∏l
j=1 b
ej
j similarly
to DBNS conversion. In [15] and [16] conversion uses an
adaptation of wNAF with detection of bj multiples into a lim-
ited window, but it requires pre-computations and additional
storage. To our knowledge, [15] and [16] provide the best
MBNS results but without hardware implementation details.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
Notations used in paper remainder are:
• k = (kn−1kn−2 . . . k1k0)2, k > 1, the n-bit scalar stored
into t words of w bits with w(t− 1) < n ≤ wt (i.e. last
word may be 0-padded). k(i) the ith word of k starting
from least significant for 0 ≤ i < t.
• B the multi-base with l base elements (co-prime integers),
B = (b1, b2, . . . , bl).
• predicate divisible(x,B) returns true if x is divisible by
at least one base element in B (false for other cases).
• number x represented as the sum of terms x =∑n′
i=1
(
di
∏l
j=1 b
ej,i
j
)
with di = ±1.
• term (di, e1,i, e2,i, . . . , el,i) defined by di×
∏l
j=1 b
ej,i
j in
B (index i may be omitted when context is clear).
1: LT← ∅
2: while k > 1 do
3: if not
(
divisible(k,B)
)
then (divisibility test)
4: d← 1
5: k ← k − 1
6: else
7: d← 0
8: for j from 1 to l do
9: ej ← 0
10: while k ≡ 0 mod bj do (divisibility test)
11: ej ← ej + 1
12: k ← k/bj (exact division)
13: LT← LT ∪ (d, e1, e2, . . . , el)
14: return LT
Fig. 3. Unsigned MBNS recoding algorithm
• Q,P curve points and Q = [k]P scalar multiplication.
Due to space limitation, we only present results for elliptic
curves defined over Fp, but it can be used for F2m (fine tuning
is slightly different due to different cost ratios I/M and S/M).
In this section, we present a simple unsigned version (di = 1)
for the sake of simplicity. Sec. IV details algorithms for signed
representations (di = ±1). Units described in this section can
be directly used or slightly adapted for signed representation.
A. Unsigned Algorithms
Our MBNS unsigned recoding algorithm, see Fig. 3, is very
simple. Divisibility of k by B elements is tested. When k is not
divisible, 1 is subtracted to k. b1 = 2 is selected for efficiency
purpose (divisibility is ensured 50% of time). For lines 8–12,
the scalar k is divided by all base elements bj in B as much as
possible using cheap divisibility tests and exact divisions. This
division step provides the term exponents e1, e2, . . . , el. LT
denotes the list of terms which stores the MBNS recoding of k,
LT =
(
(d1, e1,1, e2,1, . . . , el,1), (d2, e1,2, e2,2, . . . , el,2), . . .
)
with di ∈ {0, 1}. Only the first term may have d1 = 0 (if
the initial k is immediately divisible in B). Divisibility tests at
line 3 and 10 can be shared. The algorithm stops when k ≤ 1
due to Horner form such as 2a3b5c
(
1 + 2a
′
3b
′
5c
′
(1)
)
.
Divisibility tests are detailed in Sec. III-B. There are im-
plemented using t + ε clock cycles (ε is a small constant)
for all bj 6= 2 and only one for bj = 2
s with s ≤ w. Once
k is divisible by bj , we use fast exact division algorithms to
perform k ← k/bj as detailed in Sec. III-C and with t + ε
′
clock cycles for all bj 6= 2.
MBNS recoding algorithm in Fig. 3 works in a serial
way: one multi-base term at a time and starting with the
least significant one. Each term can be immediately used in
the scalar multiplication algorithm in Fig. 4. This algorithm
computes Q = [k]P using LT and is a multi-base adaptation of
the standard left-to-right scalar multiplication algorithm (see
for instance [1, Sec. 3.3.1]). Operation Q+ d×P at line 3 is
NOP (no operation) or ADD since d ∈ {0, 1}.
The combination of recoding (Fig. 3) and scalar multipli-
cation (Fig. 4) algorithms allows to overlap recoding steps
by curve-level operations. For instance, when divisibility by
3 is detected, exact division by 3 and TPL operations can
1: Q← O
2: foreach t in LT do (t = (d, e1, e2, . . . , el))
3: Q← Q+ d× P (d ∈ {0, 1} ⇒ NOP/ADD)
4: for j from 1 to l do
5: P ←
[
b
ej
j
]
P (DBL, TPL, QPL, . . . )
6: Q← Q+ P
7: return Q
Fig. 4. MBNS scalar multiplication algorithm Q = [k]P
be launched in parallel. Our recoding algorithm produces a
MBNS representation with a recursive factorization similar
to Horner scheme. Fig. 10 illustrates a complete example.
Unlike previous DBNS and MBNS recoding methods, ours
can be fully embedded in hardware and operates on-the-fly.
First, we do not need costly tables or computations such as
the approximation of k by multi-base terms. Second, as soon
as a divisibility is detected, we can launch the corresponding
curve-level operation.
As we start with least significant terms first, we cannot use
mixed coordinates point addition (mADD). We are obliged to
use standard point addition which is a little slower. Clearly
our method is not competitive compared to the fastest state-
of-art ones when costly off-line recoding is possible. But it
provides the first full on-the-fly hardware implementation.
Overlapping recoding operations by curve-level operations
is possible due to the very fast divisibility tests and exact
divisions. For instance, with n = 160, w = 12 and t = 14,
divisibility tests by all bj 6= 2 and exact division by one bj 6= 2
respectively require t + 3 = 17 and t + 4 = 18 clock cycles.
These small durations have to be compared to the duration of
one DBL, TPL, QPL, etc. which are significantly slower.
There is a short latency at the very beginning (less than
0.01% of total [k]P computation time for n = 160 and
even less for larger fields). The first curve-level operation is
determined using the first divisibility test results. After t + ε
clock cycles there are two cases: i) k is divisible by one multi-
base element bj then a DBL, TPL, QPL, etc. can be launched
depending on which bj divides k, ii) k is not divisible by B
elements and an ADD can be launched.
In this work we do not study an analytical evaluation of
the number of each type of curve-level operation. But we
provide extensive experimental evaluations of both these types
of operations and complete scalar multiplication duration.
Selection of B elements is required. Fig. 5 reports statistical
[k]P timings (in M) for 10 000 random 160-bit values recoded
using our unsigned MBNS algorithm for various multi-bases.
Scalar multiplication algorithm in Fig. 4 is not secure
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Fig. 5. Statistical timings of unsigned MBNS scalar multiplication
i
bj 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
5 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 1
7 4 2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1 4 2 1
TABLE I
PASCAL’S TAPES FOR DIVISIBILITY TESTS (VALUES ARE 2i mod bj )
against SCAs. Simple power analysis attacks can be used due
to the different behavior of curve-level operations in lines 3
and 5. We will see in Sec. IV how signed MBNS recoding
can be used as a protection against some attacks.
B. Implementation of the Divisibility Tests
At each recoding step, the scalar remainder has to be tested
for divisibility by all bj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. Testing divisibility by
2s with s ≤ w in a radix-2 representation is straightforward
and implemented in a very small module of the recoding unit,
see Sec. III-D. For bj 6= 2, we use a very old method based on
specific properties of the sum of argument digits modulo bj .
This method for divisibility test by bj in radix-r representation
is reported in a Blaise Pascal’s post-mortem publication [21]
(in Latin, see [22] for comments in English). This method is
often called Pascal’s tape. We only provide details for bj ∈
{3, 5, 7} as they lead to the most efficient B. Tab. I reports
the remainders 2i mod bj . They form a periodic sequence.
Using Tab. I with Pascal’s tape in case bj = 3, the periodic
sequence is (2 1)∗, then one has:
k mod 3 = (. . .+ 23k3 + 2
2k2 + 2
1k1 + k0) mod 3
= (. . .+ 2k3 + k2 + 2k1 + k0) mod 3
=
(∑
(2k2i+1 + k2i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
)
mod 3.
Computation of α requires the sum of many 2-bit words
(n≫ 100). α is a multi-bit integer, then it has to be recursively
reduced using the same method. There is a trade-off between
the size of the intermediate accumulators and the reduction
completion. Architecture presented on Fig. 6 decomposes this
large operation into partial sums accumulated and partial
reduction on a limited number of bits for each word of the
scalar. This is the purpose of the light block denoted “
∑
for
bj = 3” and connected register on Fig. 6. Then t cycles are
required for the accumulation and partial reduction. The very
last reduction steps and comparison to bj is denoted “R for
bj” in the second type of light block. Clock, reset and enable
signals are not represented on the figures.
For bj = 7, the sum uses 3-bit words with the sequence
(4 2 1)∗. But for bj = 5, the sequence is (3 4 2 1)
∗ where digit
3 requires a specific treatment. A first solution uses 3 = 1+2
and an unsigned sum with additional inputs. A second solution
considers 3 ≡ −2 mod 5 and a signed sum with less operands
(but with sign extension). Architecture on Fig. 6 allows parallel
divisibility test by several bj in only one computation.
...
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4
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1
Fig. 6. Divisibility tests architecture
area freq. clock
w slices (FF/LUT) MHz cycles
12 25 (40/81) 543 t+ 3
24 67 (53/152) 549 t+ 4
TABLE II
FPGA IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR DIVISIBILITY TESTS
Parameter w significantly impacts performances. The
lengths of remainders sequences for bj = 3, 5, 7 are re-
spectively 2, 4, 3 (from Tab. I). To avoid complex decoding
schemes, we use w = lcm(2, 4, 3) = 12 and w = 24 (larger
multiples of 12 slow down the recoding unit).
Hardware implementations reported below have been de-
scribed in VHDL and implemented on a XC5VLX50T FPGA
using ISE 12.4 from Xilinx with standard efforts for synthesis,
place and route. We report numbers of clock cycles, best clock
frequencies and numbers of occupied slices. We also report
numbers of look-up tables (LUTs with 6 inputs in Virtex 5) and
flip-flops (FFs) for area. A XC5VLX50T contains 7 200 slices
with 4 LUT and 4 flip-flops per slice. We use flip-flops for all
storage elements. FPGA implementation results are reported
in Tab. II for divisibility tests by bj ∈ {3, 5, 7} and n = 160.
C. Implementation of the Exact Division by bj Elements
Here, exact division k/bj means that we know that dividend
k is divisible by divisor bj (using divisibility tests presented
above). This significantly optimizes the division. [23] provides
an efficient algorithm when the radix is prime or power of 2.
Division by 2s is straightforward and is not considered in this
section (a shifter is included in the recoding unit Sec. III-D).
We use a dedicated version of algorithm presented in [23]
for bj ∈ {3, 5, 7} and optimized for hardware implementation.
Our algorithm, presented in Fig. 7, operates in t iterations
in a word-serial way starting with least significant. Iteration
number i deals with k(i) the ith word of k. The inverse of
divisor bj modulo 2
w is a constant and always exists since
multi-base elements are co-prime and include 2.
The main differences for the 3 operations (bj ∈ {3, 5, 7})
are the multiplication by modular inverse on line 4 and
comparisons to constants on line 7. All other elements are
shared in the architecture (operators, control, registers).
Tab. III reports binary representations of modular inverses
for exact division by 3, 5, 7. Multiplication r× (b−1j mod 2
w)
at line 4 in Fig. 7 is implemented as a sequence of ad-
ditions/subtractions and shifts using an in-house multiplica-
tion by constants algorithm [24]. Subtraction at line 3 is
bj b
−1
j mod 2
12, γ b−1j mod 2
24, γ
3 (101010101011)2, 3 (101010101010101010101011)2, 4
5 (110011001101)2, 3 (110011001100110011001101)2, 4
7 (110110110111)2, 3 (110110110110110110110111)2, 4
TABLE III
MODULAR INVERSES USED IN EXACT DIVISIONS
area freq. clock
w slices (FF/LUT) MHz cycles
12 59 (138/171) 291 t+ 4
24 152 (441/448) 202 t+ 5
TABLE IV
FPGA IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR EXACT DIVISION.
inserted in the sequence. Some adders in the 3 sequences
are shared to reduce area. Tab. III reports γ the number of
additions/subtractions required to perform r× (b−1j mod 2
w).
The architecture of our exact division by bj ∈ {3, 5, 7} unit
is presented on Fig. 8. At iteration i, word k(i), read (R port)
from scalar memory, is added to −c and used in the addition
sequence (block denoted “×(bj mod 2
w)” and “± seq.”)
corresponding to bj . The correct value is selected by MUX1 and
written in scalar memory (W port). We use an in-place version
of the algorithm k ← k/bj to keep memory footprint as small
as possible. Comparisons in loop lines 6–8 of algorithm Fig. 7
are unrolled and implemented as combinatorial logic (“cmp.
bj” block) for each bj ∈ {3, 5, 7}. The correct value c is
selected by MUX2 and sent the addition sequences. The FPGA
implementation results for our exact division unit are reported
in Tab. IV for n = 160. For w = 24, speed decreases due
to the complexity of the comparison blocks. For example, in
case bj = 7, six comparisons are required.
D. Unsigned Multiple-Base Recoding Unit
The complete recoding unit architecture is presented on
Fig. 9. The scalar memory stores k. The small subtraction
block is in charge of line 5 in the recoding algorithm Fig. 3.
The DTD-2 block is in charge of divisibility test (1-bit result)
and exact division (w-bit bus) by 2 or small powers of 2
(2s with s ≤ w, if s > w several iterations are used).
Divisibility test unit for other base elements is described
in Sec. III-B (3-bit output) while the exact division unit is
1: c← 0
2: for i from 0 to t− 1 do
3: r ← k(i) − c
4: r ← r × (b−1j mod 2
w)
5: c← 0
6: for h from 1 to bj − 1 do
7: if r ≥ h× ⌈(2w − 1)/bj⌉ then
8: c← c+ 1
9: k(i) ← (rw−1 · · · r0)
10: return k
Fig. 7. Exact division algorithm for k/bj
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Fig. 8. Exact division unit architecture
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Fig. 9. Complete recoding unit architecture
described in Sec. III-C (w-bit output). MUX selects which unit
output should be written in the scalar memory. The global
controller (CTRL) generates all control signals for units. It
also provides the global control with informations on which
curve-level operations have to be launched.
FPGA implementation results for the complete unsigned
recoding unit are reported in Tab. V for B = (2, 3, 5, 7) and
n = 160 (see Sec. IV-B for comparison to a ECC processor).
Our recoding unit operates significantly faster than curve-
level operations and in parallel to them. It provides on-the-fly
informations on which curve-level operations to be launched
without interruptions as illustrated on Fig. 10. On this figure,
“CLO” denotes curve-level operations, DT denotes divisibility
test, “res.” their results and “/bj” exact division by bj . For
k = 87, the recoding is 87 = 0 + 31 × (1 + 2271).
The first term (0 + 3) recoding is performed as fast as
possible while the second one (1 + 2271) is spread over
the computations curve-level operations, without interruption.
This provides us options when designing the control.
For n = 160, w = 12 and t = 14, recoding a scalar
corresponding to 28345271 requires 292 clock cycles. This is
less than one DBL operation (even for a parallel architecture).
It reduces to 195 clock cycles for w = 24 and t = 7. The
same term recoding requires 772 clocks cycles for n = 521
and w = 12 (435 for w = 24).
E. Validation
Both recoding and scalar multiplication algorithms have
been implemented in PARI/GP (http://pari.math.u-bordeaux.
area freq.
w slices (FF/LUT) MHz
12 153 (301/412) 232
24 323 (682/908) 202
TABLE V
FPGA IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR COMPLETE RECODING UNIT
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Fig. 10. MBNS recoding and scalar multiplication illustration for k = 87
unsigned version
4: d← 1
5: k ← k − 1
−→
signed version
4: d← S(k)
5: k ← k − d
Fig. 11. Modifications between the unsigned and signed recoding algorithms
fr/) and SAGE (http://www.sagemath.org/) mathematical soft-
wares (each author was in charge of one version GP or SAGE).
The results of the two versions have been compared to the
mathematical values and cross-checked for very large random
data sets (millions of scalars for many sizes n ∈ [160, 520]
bits). Functional validation of the architecture was done using
some VHDL simulations on limited sets of random data
and compared to the mathematical values. For performance
validation, a lot of random tests and comparisons to state-of-
art results have been performed (see Sec. V).
IV. SIGNED-DIGIT OPTIMIZATIONS
The unsigned recoding algorithm, Fig. 3 of Sec. III-A, only
performs k ← k−1 when k is not divisible by B elements. As
with other number systems, such as Booth recoding, wNAF,
Avizienis representations, or DBNS, using signed digits may
help us to reduce the number of terms.
A. Signed-Digit MBNS Recoding
A simple modification of our MBNS recoding algorithm
Fig. 3 is required to support signed digits as illustrated on
Fig. 11. A selection function S has been introduced to select
the digit d = ±1 to be used for each term (d, e1, e2, . . . , el)
when k is not divisible by B elements. Depending on d,
updating the scalar requires a subtraction (d = 1 similarly
to the unsigned version) or an addition (d = −1). The scalar
multiplication algorithm Fig. 4 is unchanged. At curve level,
digit values correspond to: a point addition when d = 1, a
point subtraction when d = −1 and no operation when d = 0
(for the very first term only).
Determining S such that the recoding algorithm always
produces the shortest list of terms is a very hard problem.
We compared 4 heuristic selection functions and trade-offs be-
tween recoding performances (LT length) and implementation
complexity (i.e. silicon area and recoding speed).
1) Minimum value selection function (min): min is illus-
trated on Fig. 12. When k is not divisible, then k − 1 and
k + 1 will be divisible by, at least, 2 (we always use b1 = 2
in practice) and potentially other bj . For each value k − 1
and k+1, divisibility tests and exact division unit are used to
S
k
not divisible
k − 1
k + 1
k
′
k
′′
divisibility
tests
&
exact
divisions
?
d = +1
d = −1
d
Fig. 12. Principle of the min selection function
produce k′ and k′′. k′ (resp. k′′) corresponds to k − 1 (resp.
k + 1) divided as much as possible by B elements. S returns
d = 1 if k′ < k′′, else it returns d = −1 (test k′ ≤ k′′
leads to similar performances). The min selection function
only provides a local minimum for the total number of terms.
A second scalar memory (t words × w bits) has been added
in the recoding unit to store both k′ and k′′. The exponents
corresponding to both k − 1 and k + 1 have been computed
and stored during the exploration. The controller is adapted
such that the correct set of exponents is selected.
2) Maximum number of divisors selection function
(max_nb_div): In min, half of divisibility tests and exact
divisions are discarded. In max_nb_div, the number of
base elements bj which divide k − 1 and k + 1 is counted.
S returns d according to the maximum number of divisors
among k − 1 and k + 1. Only divisibility unit for k − 1 and
k + 1 is used, not the exact division unit. max_nb_div is a
cheap optimization but with low efficiency (see Sec. IV-C).
3) Approximated minimum value selection function
(approx): In order to provide a cheap optimization but
with higher performances, the approx selection function
compares approximations of k′ and k′′ from min (instead of
computing them exactly like in min). Exponents e′j (resp.
e′′j ) correspond to the divisibility test results for k − 1 (resp.
k + 1). The approximations of k′ and k′′ are respectively
defined by δ′ = ⌊log2(k − 1)⌋ + 1 −
∑l
j=1 e
′
j log2(bj)
and δ′′ = ⌊log2(k + 1)⌋ + 1 −
∑l
j=1 e
′′
j log2(bj) where
⌊log2(k − 1)⌋ + 1 is the position of the most significant
bit (MSB) of k − 1 (idem for k + 1). MSB positions can
be easily detected using our divisibility test unit (during
the t iterations loop for each word). Approximation of
weight
∏l
j=1 b
e′j
j (or with e
′′
j exponents) uses the sum
of multiplications by log2(bj) constants. Our divisibility
unit returns limited exponents: e′j ≤ 1 for bj 6= 2 and
e′j ≤ w for bj = 2 (see Sec. III-B). Then, there is no
need for multiplications. As an example, for B = (2, 3, 5, 7)
δ′ = MSB(k− 1)−eb1=2−1.5eb2=3−2.25eb3=5−2.75eb4=7
where eb1=2 ≤ w and eb2=3, eb3=5, eb4=7 ≤ 1. The constants
come from: log2 3 ≈ 1.59, log2 5 ≈ 2.32, and log2 7 ≈ 2.81.
area freq.
w slices (FF/LUT) MHz
12 173 (326/466) 232
24 345 (724/1 005) 202
TABLE VI
FPGA IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR SIGNED RECODING UNIT.
memory area freq.
version type slices (FF/LUT) BRAM MHz
small
distributed 2 204 (3 971/6 816) 0 155
BRAM 1793 (3 641/6 182) 6 155
large
distributed 3 182 (4 668/7 361) 0 142
BRAM 2427 (4 297/6 981) 6 142
TABLE VII
FPGA IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR A COMPLETE ECC PROCESSOR
OVER Fp WITH n = 160 BITS (FROM [25])
The approximation for both k′ and k′′, as well as their
comparison, can be easily implemented using a very small
circuit (see [24]).
4) 2 steps minimum value selection function (min2): It
uses the time margin illustrated on Fig. 10 using a recursion
limited to the next term. The first step uses min with (k−1, k+
1) to produce (k′, k′′). The second step uses min with (k′ −
1, k′+1, k′′−1, k′′+1) to produce (ζ ′, ζ ′′, ζ ′′′, ζ ′′′′). S returns
d according to the minimum value among ζ ′, ζ ′′, ζ ′′′, ζ ′′′′.
B. FPGA Implementation
Signed MBNS recoding unit has been implemented on
FPGA (see end of Sec. III-B for target and tools details).
Tab. VI reports corresponding results for approx selection
function, B = (2, 3, 5, 7) and n = 160 bits. Compared to
the unsigned version Tab. V, area overhead for signed version
is very small: 13% more slices (8% FF and 13% LUTs). In
Virtex 5 FPGAs, very small memories, such scalar ones, can be
efficiently implemented using distributed RAMs in the LUTs
of SLICEMs. This explains why only 25 additional flip-flops
are required for the signed version while there is a 168-bit
memory (t = 14 and w = 12) for the second scalar memory.
The same speed is achieved for both signed and unsigned
versions (the critical path is in the exact division unit).
In order to compare our MBNS recoding unit to a complete
ECC processor, Tab. VII reports two FPGA implementations
of an ECC processor provided by the authors of [25] (for
curves over Fp, n = 160 bits and Jacobian coordinates). The
first one (small version) uses NAF method with one arithmetic
unit per field operation, while the second (large version) uses
4NAF method and two arithmetic units per field operation
but one modular inversion. Our MBNS signed recoding unit
work at higher frequency than the ECC processor. And its area
represents less than 10% (resp. 7%) for w = 12 compared to
the complete small (resp. large) version of the ECC processor.
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Fig. 13. Statistical performance evaluation of signed MBNS recoding and
scalar multiplication (top: a 6= −3, bottom: a = −3)
C. Experimental Analysis
Fig. 13 presents statistical analysis results for average com-
putation time (in M) of 10 000 scalar multiplications with 160-
bit random scalars recoded using our signed MBNS algorithm
for various multi-bases and the 4 selection functions presented
in Sec. IV-A. Most efficient multi-bases are B = (2, 3, 5)
and B = (2, 3, 5, 7) with very close performances. Selection
function max_nb_div is not efficient, min and approx
have very close performances, and approx is the best trade-
off between performances and recoding cost (min requires
longer computations and more energy).
D. Randomized Selection Function
Side-channel attacks exploit some correlations between se-
cret values manipulated in the device and physical parameters
measured on the device such as power consumption, electro-
magnetic emanations or computation timing. Refer to [26]
for a complete introduction on power analysis based SCAs.
Typical SCAs and counter-measures for ECC are summa-
rized respectively in [27] and [28]. Protections against simple
attacks (based on only one or a very few traces) mainly
use uniformization (or atomicity) and randomization methods.
Protections against differential attacks (based on statistics over
many traces) mainly use randomization methods.
We experimented with a simple randomized selection func-
tion (rnd) as a protection against some SCAs. When k is
not divisible by B elements, S returns d = 1 or d = −1
randomly. Obviously this leads to larger number of terms (and
point additions) in the recoding as reported in Tab. VIII (for
simplified Weierstrass curves with a 6= −3 and 10 000 random
scalars). Proposed randomization scheme allows a scalar sub-
string to be represented using totally different recodings. This
is a direct protection against some differential attacks due to
the very huge number of different representations using signed
digits [14, Tab. 2]. For protection against simple attacks, real
rnd min diff.
B M #ADD M #ADD [%]
(2,3) 1 960.5 49.3 1 738.5 34.0 12.8
(2,3,5) 1 843.0 39.8 1 673.7 28.0 10.1
(2,3,5,7) 1 811.4 34.8 1 670.0 24.8 8.5
(2,3,5,7,11) 1 816.7 32.1 1 693.5 22.9 7.3
TABLE VIII
AVERAGE COMPUTATION TIME (M) AND POINT ADDITION NUMBER (#ADD)
USING THE RANDOMIZED SELECTION FUNCTION (a 6= −3)
robustness of our randomized selection function relies on
the fact that point addition and point subtraction cannot be
distinguished in traces. Indeed, protecting the sign change
when using point subtraction is supposed to be simple in
the circuit. But we still have to perform a more complete
security evaluation at hardware level using a real attack system
and to compare to other protection schemes (e.g. addition
chains [29]).
V. COMPARISON TO STATE-OF-ART
Below we compare our MBNS recoding and scalar multipli-
cation algorithms for various multi-bases to state-of-art meth-
ods. We report results over Fp for simplified Weierstrass curves
with unspecified parameter a and a = −3, using Jacobian
coordinates, similarly to most of DBNS/MBNS references.
A. Costs of Curve-Level Operations
Tab. IX reports best computation costs, given in field-
level operations (M, S) for various curve-level operations over
Fp from literature. EFD is the excellent web site Explicit-
Formulas Database http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD.
We apply the typical cost assumption used in many references:
1S = 0.8 M. λDBL (resp. λTPL) denotes a sequence of λ
successive DBL (resp. TPL) operations (e.g. k = 2λ or k = 3λ).
We use λDBL or λTPL operations when they are faster than
their equivalent sequence of DBL or TPL.
B. Performance Comparisons
Some previous scalar multiplication algorithms require ad-
ditional points to speed up computations. These additional
points are multiples of the initial point P and stored in the
cryptoprocessor during the complete scalar multiplication (2
n-bit registers per additional point). Most of methods assume
pre-computed points represented using affine coordinates to
benefit from fast mixed coordinates addition mADD. Tab. X
reports costs of typical pre-computations. Costs at field-level
include a conversion to affine coordinates which requires field
inversions (usually 1M+1S+2I per addition point). We assume
1I = 15M for Fp inversion.
These costs can be neglected for multiple successive [k]P
operations with the same P , but it is not the case if P
changes before each scalar multiplication (e.g. support of
various protocols/sizes, base point randomization method, . . . ).
Tab. XI and XII compares scalar multiplication methods
from literature to our signed MBNS method using 10 000
random scalars and approx selection function. In these
tables, DBNS results have been computed using the PARI/GP
program kindly provided by the author of [7]. This program
generates a signed DBNS chain using pre-computations and
where approximations are obtained by a search table.
The results presented in references [16] and [32] are based
on a left-to-right MBNS scalar multiplication algorithm to
benefit from mADD while the scalar is recoded using a right-
to-left algorithm (this strategy prevents them from providing
an on-the-fly computation). If we use a similar strategy, the
computation cost reduction is estimated to
(
(11 + 5× 0.8)−
(7 + 4 × 0.8)
)
times the number of ADD operations. In case
B = (2, 3, 5) and n = 160, this leads to a reduction about
134M. Hence, references [16] and [32] are still faster than our
method but with a much smaller difference.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a simple multi-base recoding al-
gorithm for ECC scalar multiplication in hardware without any
pre-computations. The scalar recoding is performed on-the-
fly and in parallel to curve-level operations without additional
latency. The proposed recoding circuit uses cheap divisibility
test by multi-base elements and exact division using very small
dedicated hardware units. Our MBNS recoding and scalar
multiplication method is a little less competitive compared to
other DBNS/MBNS methods when pre-computations or off-
line recoding can be used. But our method leads to more
efficient solutions in embedded applications fully integrated
in hardware without resources for costly recoding and limited
storage. As future work, we plan to deal with more advanced
recoding schemes to reduce the number of produced terms
and improved randomization schemes to increase robustness
against side-channel attacks.
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